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In the Netherlands, concerns about the negative experiences of patients with legal procedures following 
adverse medical events have led to potentially profound changes in the field of procedural complaint- and 
compensation law. This report offers insight into the Dutch legal framework of compensation for damage 
caused by healthcare. We start by presenting the traditional framework in part A: The Dutch landscape of 
medical liability. Having laid the groundwork, we try to explain the innovations that have recently been 
introduced, in part B: Efforts for reform. We elaborate on the problems patients experience when they 
claim for compensation, the impact legal procedures can have on both patients and healthcare 
professionals, the recent changes in legislation trying to address these problems, and how these changes 
force both healthcare and legal professionals to adapt to a new reality.  
 
A. THE DUTCH LANDSCAPE OF MEDICAL LIABILITY 
 
A.1. The legal relationship between healthcare professional and the patient 
The Dutch system for compensation of damage arising from health care is fault based. The rights of 
patients and the corresponding duties of healthcare professionals are laid down in the Medical Treatment 
Contracts Act (WGBO) which is part of the Dutch Civil Code (DCC), and the Healthcare Quality, 
Complaints and Disputes Act (WKKGZ). The WGBO is an act on healthcare professionals’ duties 
concerning individual patient care, the WKKGZ sets out obligations on complaint management and 
quality of care, including the out of court resolution of claims for compensation.   
The relationship between the healthcare professional and the patient is a specific contract, the 
medical treatment contract, for which binding rules are given in the WGBO,
1
 such as the general 
obligation of the health care professional to observe the standards of good care and to act in conformity 
                                                          
 Berber Laarman LLM (https://research.vu.nl/en/persons/berber-laarman) is researcher at the Amsterdam Centre for 
Comprehensive Law (ACCL) of Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, the Netherlands and coordinating researcher of OPEN, a learning 
network of hospitals on the open and fair resolution of complaints and claims in health care (www.openindezorg.nl). OPEN is 
funded by the Victim Support Fund (Fonds Slachtofferhulp). Prof. dr. Arno Akkermans (https://research.vu.nl/en/persons/arno-
akkermans) is professor of law at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam and director of the ACCL 
(www.rechten.vu.nl/en/research/organization/research-institutes-and-centres/accl/index.aspx). For helpful comments on an earlier 
draft, the authors are indebted to prof. Prue Vines, UNSW Law School, Sydney. 
1 Article 7:446 DCC. 
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with the responsibilities laid upon him by the professional standard that is applicable to him.
2
 Acting in 
breach of the duty of providing good care is qualified as failure to fulfill a contractual duty.
3
  
In case law on the contractual
4
 liability of professionals the criterion of the ‘reasonably able and 
reasonably acting’
5
 professional has been developed to describe the general standard of care that is 
expected of all professions, i.e. not limited to the medical professions.
6
 This general criterion is 
operationalized by the applicable professional standard, depending on the profession involved. The 
performance of professionals is evaluated by asking what a reasonably able and reasonably acting 
colleague would have done in the same circumstances.  
For health care professions, the professional standard is composed of the state of the art of 
medical practice, construed inter alia out of relevant guidelines, protocols and scientific publications. 
Case law is also an important source, not only of the courts, but especially of the medical disciplinary 
tribunals, where medical and legal experts decide on the quality of care provided by individual healthcare 
professionals. The professional standard is a melting pot of standards and norms of different origin, not 
only in regard of very different sources, but also in the sense that it contains a mixture of standards and 
norms from international and national origin, and it is difficult to reconstruct what norm to what extent 
originates from where. In general, the level of accepted medical knowledge (ars medica) will be 
considered from the international perspective of the applicable medical sub discipline, but the test of what 
a ‘reasonably able and reasonably acting’ colleague would have done in the same circumstances, naturally 
allows for all the circumstances of the case at hand,
7
 including circumstances that might be typical for the 
Netherlands. On the other side of the spectrum, there are norms that formally are of a national origin, such 
as norms on communication and openness on adverse events, but these as well are often inspired and/or 
informed by the ideas and practices in other countries. The Netherlands is a very open jurisdiction, both in 
practice and in theory, and the question whether a certain norm has a national or international origin is not 
always easy to answer and is rarely relevant. 
Logically, following from the obligation to act as a good care provider (and not a perfect one), the 
complexity of the human body, and the limitations and imperfections of health care, the medical treatment 
contract is considered to give rise to ‘obligations of means’ (obligation de moyens),
8
 although the nature 
of things can be such that that certain obligations, such as the obligation of a surgeon to amputate the right 
                                                          
2 Article 7:453 DCC. 
3 Article 6:74 DCC in conjunction with article 7:453 DCC. 
4 The same criterion applies in tort. 
5 ‘Redelijk handelend en redelijk bekwaam’. 
6 The norm of the ‘reasonably able and reasonably acting’ professional was first formulated by the Dutch Supreme Court in the 
Speeckaert/Gradener case, ECLI:NL:HR:1990:AC1103, and later laid down in article 7:453 DCC. 
7 The standard is the same for junior or new doctors, and there is some controversy on whether the kind of hospital should be 
allowed to make any difference (e.g. academic medical center or not). 
8 In several civil law jurisdictions a doctrinal distinction is made, originating in French law, between two types of contractual 
obligation: an ‘obligation of result’(in French: obligation de résultat) is an obligation to achieve a certain result (also known as 
output based obligations) is distinguished from an ‘obligation of means’ (in French: obligation de moyens), this is an obligation 
to dedicate a certain amount of resource to achieving a particular result (also known as input based obligations). If a contractual 
breach is committed in respect of an ‘obligation of result’, the plaintiff has only to demonstrate that the contractual result has not 
been achieved. The debtor is then deemed liable, except if he can prove that his obligations under the agreement were not 
fulfilled because of force majeure or an act or omission of the plaintiff. If a contractual breach is committed of an ‘obligation of 
means’, the plaintiff must prove that the debtor has acted wrongfully by not performing his obligations with the necessary degree 
of care and diligence. Whether an obligation is deemed to be an ‘obligation of result’ or ‘obligation of means’ will depend partly 
on the uncertainty of the result to be achieved and partly on the intention of the parties. For further analysis, see: Dario Alessi, 
The Distinction between Obligations de Résultat and Obligations de Moyens and the Enforceability of Promises (2005) 13 
European Review of Private Law, Issue 5, pp. 657–692. In the Netherlands, the distinction is not always made nor always 
considered relevant, and the Courts are free to decide on issues of proof according to all the circumstances of the case at hand.  
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leg and not the wrong one, will nonetheless be qualified as an ‘obligation of result’ (obligation de 
résultat).
9
 Dutch legal doctrine is not familiar with the concept of an obligation de moyens renforcée.
10
 
Dutch law is familiar with the concept of aléa thérapeutique to identify adverse medical events 
that were not caused by errors or any other form of substandard care, but are considered risks inherent to 
the condition or the treatment of the patient. These are called ‘complications’ (complicaties) and, as 
Dutch medical liability is fault-based, cannot give rise to liability. There is, however, no separate 
normative framework for identifying ‘complications’, as they are already singled out by the applicable 
test of asking what a reasonably able and reasonably acting colleague would have done in the same 
circumstances. If the care provided was up to standard, any negative health results will be considered a 
‘complication’ and cannot give rise to a right to compensation. 
In situations where the patient is unable to consent, no treatment contract is concluded, for 
instance when the patient is unconscious. In the absence of a treatment contract the basis of liability will 
be in tort. Dutch tort law is organized starting from a general statutory provision, article 6:162 of the 
Dutch Civil Code, that mentions three separate forms of unlawfulness. There is some scholarly debate on 
the meaning of these different forms, but in practice these theoretical differences are of no consequence, 
and for all practical purposes the tortious ground for medical liability can best be translated as the tort of 
negligence. Here exactly the same criterion applies, namely the test what a ‘reasonably able and 
reasonably acting’ colleague would have done in the same circumstances. As a result, the doctrinal 
distinction between contract and tort in medical cases is rarely relevant.  









A.2. The relationship between healthcare professional, healthcare provider  
and the liability insurance company 
First a note on relevant Dutch legal vernacular: in Dutch health care regulations, ‘healthcare 
professional’
14
 is a comprehensive term meaning doctors, such as surgeons or physicians, but also general 
practitioners, dentists and nurses. The ‘healthcare provider’ is the surrounding institution; the hospital, 
clinic or nursing home. Often the ‘healthcare professional’ and the ‘healthcare provider’ are distinct 
entities. An exception is when a family doctor or a dentist, or any other professionals who typically work 
in smaller clinics, have their own individual practice. In the terms of Dutch health care regulations, they 
are both ‘healthcare provider’ and ‘healthcare professional’. Most Dutch medical specialists work as self-
employed entrepreneurs in hospitals. Medical specialists are usually organized in a ‘Medisch 
Specialistisch Bedrijf’ (MSB, Medical Specialist Enterprise), a partnership organized around one or more 
medical specialties working within a hospital on the basis of a contract with that hospital. Typically, 
caring and assisting personnel will be employed by the hospital.  
                                                          
9 A medical treatment contract can give rise to ‘obligations of result’ when the parties at the moment of entering into the contract 
intended the healthcare professional to guarantee a certain and explicitly described result, or that intention can be deemed to have 
existed based on parties’ declarations and conduct when concluding the agreement. 
10 This is a ‘strengthened’ obligation of means, sometimes called the obligation of ‘diminished’ result: it is the debtor's duty to 
release himself, but the proof required is easier than that of force majeure. 
11 Article 6:77 BW. 
12 Article 6:76 BW. 
13 Article 6:174 BW. 
14 The WKKGZ addresses all healthcare providers. This means the same obligations on managing complaints and quality apply 
to institutions like hospitals and nursing homes, and to individually working practitioners like family doctors and dentists.  
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Patients receiving treatment in a hospital will therefore often have to do with several legally 
separate contractual partners. This legal dimension of hospital health care will of course rarely coincide 
with the perceptions of patients, and could give rise to all kinds of hampering complications when 
patients want to exercise their legal rights or undertake other forms of action. This is why article 7:462 
Dutch Civil Code provides for so called ‘central liability of the hospital’. Central liability enables patients 
who experience harm in a hospital
15
 to address the hospital directly in regard of all treatment received in 
that hospital.
16
 Central liability is also reflected in liability insurance arrangements, as it logically obliges 
hospitals to acquire comprehensive intramural liability insurance coverage, providing coverage for all 
healthcare professionals working within the same hospital, whether they are employees or not.
17
 
 All hospitals carry some form of agreed upon deductible excess, but the amounts vary widely, 
from a relatively small excess on each separate claim to an overall annual excess of several millions. 
Below the threshold of the deductible excess the level of involvement of the insurance company varies. 
Some hospitals handle claims below the agreed upon threshold independently from the insurance 
company. They will have an internal legal department or a complaints officer with the necessary expertise 
to manage (most) claims properly, and the insurance company’s involvement is limited to accepting 
payments as part of the deductible excess – if applicable. It might also be that a health care provider, 
when confronted with a more complex claim, involves a professional loss adjuster. At the other end of the 
spectrum, all claims are referred to the insurance company entirely. In that case a professional claims 
handler of the insurance company takes over all matters pertaining to the claim, including correspondence 
with the patient. Between these extremes, many different arrangements and forms of cooperation occur, 
depending on the hospital, the policy of the insurance company, but also on the case at hand. Sometimes 
hospitals prefer to refer a certain claim to the insurance company because the patient is still receiving 
treatment and they fear that legal issues might interfere with the relationship between the patient and the 
healthcare professional. Conversely, the relationship with the patient may have deteriorated to the point 
that referring the claim to the insurance company has become the preferable option. 
 
A.3. Open disclosure and apologies 
The Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes Act (WKKGZ) obliges healthcare providers to inform 
patients about the nature and circumstances of adverse events. The Act expects providers to be open and 
honest about ‘any unintended or unexpected event that relates to the quality of the care and has resulted, 
could have resulted or could result in harm to the client’.
18
 The codification of this obligation by statute 
was merely the crowning moment of the preceding evolution of the applicable professional standard. The 
careful reader will have noted that this statutory definition of adverse events includes the so called near 
misses (‘could have resulted’). It is all but the near misses that have to be brought ‘without delay’
19
 to the 
attention of the patient on the initiative of the healthcare provider.
20
  
The Dutch market for medical liability insurance is dominated by two mutual insurance 
societies,
21
 that for some time now have been actively promoting an open and proactive approach of their 
insured towards adverse events, including open disclosure and the offering of apologies where 
                                                          
15 ‘Hospital’ here can mean a nursing home, psychiatric hospital, academic hospital, specialist clinic, etc.  
16 Article 7:462 DCC. 
17 R.P. Wijne, Aansprakelijkheid voor zorgrelateerde schade, Utrecht: Boom Juridische Uitgevers 2013 (Dissertation Erasmus 
University, with English summary), p.307. 
18 Article 1 section 1 WKKGZ. 
19 It remains to be seen what this exactly means. Hospitals try to achieve ‘within 24 hours’, but this is not always possible. 
20 Article 10 section 3 WKKGZ. 
21 These are VVAA / MediRisk (www.medirisk.nl) and Centramed (www.centramed.nl). 
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appropriate. It is explained to the insured that admitting fault and apologizing must be distinguished from 
accepting liability, the former belonging to the responsibility of the healthcare professional, and the latter 
to the responsibility of the insurer or the legal department of the hospital. The prevailing view that the 
admission of fault and apologies as such do not constitute acceptance of liability has up till now been 
sustained by the very few court and disciplinary cases that explicitly address this issue.
22
 Regretfully, it 
cannot be said that outside the specific domain of medical liability insurance, that is to say, in the domain 
of professional liability insurance in general, all insurance companies take the same enlightened approach 
to the issue of admitting fault and apologising by their insured. The Dutch Civil Code does however 
contain a provision that is relevant to this issue and applicable to all liability insurance policies:      
 
Article 7:953 DCC: If a liability insurance prohibits the insured to make certain 
acknowledgements, then a violation of this prohibition will not have any effect insofar as such 




This provision can be understood as being part of the general principle that parties to a civil procedure 
should be truthful
24
 and was explicitly introduced to protect those who correctly admit fault from being 
excluded from their insurance coverage.
25
 The medical liability insurers no longer entertain any 
prohibitions of this kind in their insurance contracts, not only out of well understood self-interest but 
simply because such conditions would induce their insured to act contrary to their professional standard. 
But a recent examination of liability insurance policies available on the internet revealed the survival 
outside of the medical domain of many ‘outdated’ policy provisions that article 7:953 DCC renders 
unenforceable and therefore can only misinform the insured about their options in regard of well-founded 
allegations of mistake or fault.
26
 This might help to explain that the ‘popular belief’ that liability insurance 
stands in the way of admission of fault and the offering of apologies is still widely spread in society and, 
in spite of all recent efforts, has not yet been completely eradicated among the medical professions. 
 
A.4.  The current debate on compensation of damage caused by health care 
In the Netherlands at the moment there is no prevailing perception of a ‘medical liability crisis’ asking for 
measures such as limiting the number of medical litigation cases (other than by increased patient safely 
and the promotion of the non-adversarial resolution of claims) and diminishing the amount of financial 
compensation. Rather there are concerns, in both the scholarly and the political debate, that (1) inept 
responses to complaints and adverse events lead to unnecessary juridification,
27
 including the undue 
assertion of claims and the lodging of disciplinary complaints, both giving rise to destructive adversarial 
processes; that (2) this is to the detriment of both patients and health care professionals; and that (3), 
                                                          
22 This view is not without controversy. See A.M. Zwart-Hink ‘The Doctor has apologised. Will I now get Compensation for my 
Injuries? Myth and Reality in Apologies and Liability’, Oñati Socio-legal Series 2017 [online], 7 (3), 497-510. Available from: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3029245. 
23 Translation by the authors. Art. 7:953 Burgerlijk Wetboek: ‘Indien een verzekering tegen aansprakelijkheid bepaalde 
erkenningen door de verzekerde verbiedt, heeft overtreding van dat verbod geen gevolg voor zover de erkenning juist is. Een 
verbod tot erkenning van feiten heeft nimmer gevolg’.  
24 Article 21 Dutch Code of Civil Procedure: The parties are obliged to provide fully and truthfully the facts relevant to the case. 
If this obligation is not complied with, the court can take the measures it deems appropriate (Translation by the authors). 
25 A.M. Zwart-Hink (2017), The Doctor has apologized, p. 501. 
26 A.M. Zwart- Hink (2017). The Doctor has apologized, p. 500-501. 
27 Phenomenon where a situation escalates into legal conflict, discussions escalate, opinions harden, parties alienate, and 
generally it becomes more difficult to achieve a reasonable solution.  
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where there is a legitimate claim for compensation, it should be honored, but this often takes a long time 
and is difficult and burdensome, both financially and emotionally.  
 
A. 4.1 What makes medical liability more difficult? 
To start with the last concern, research has revealed that, however flat the Dutch landscape may 
be, patients experiencing harm in healthcare may have many mountains to cross when claiming for 
compensation, more so than in other cases of personal injury such as traffic accidents.
28
 There seem to be 
several reasons for this difference.  
To begin with, both fault and causality are generally more difficult to establish than for instance 
in case of traffic accidents. Traffic rules are generally quite unambiguous, their violation relatively easy to 
determine, whereas what follows exactly from a health care provider’s professional standard in a given 
situation will often be much less clearly defined, allowing for different approaches and depending on 
different aspects of the case, often with some room for professional discretion. In many cases it may 
require one or more expert opinions, with all the delays and costs involved, to bring final clarity to a case. 
Causality, also, will often be more difficult to establish, as distinguishing between the consequences of 
the incident and what would have been the natural progression of the patients’ condition can be very 
difficult. In the fault-based Dutch system, the burden of proof lies with the patient, although case law has 
developed several instruments to alleviate that burden.  
Three of those instruments should be mentioned here.
29
 The first instrument is specific to medical 
cases, and involves a doctrine that sets down heightened requirements to any refutations the healthcare 
professional might make of submissions of facts by the patient. A simple denial will never do, but will 
have to be substantiated, for instance by the provision of documentation like the patient’s medical file.
30
 It 
is emphasized that this in itself does not amount to a reversal of the burden of proof, although the result 
may be the same. The applicable standard is whether the information provided by the healthcare 
professional is providing the patient sufficient clues to go on in the gathering of facts and delivering of 
proof to substantiate his claim.
31
 When the professional fails to meet this standard, the court can accept 
the patients’ statements as insufficiently disputed or place the burden of proof upon the professional.
32
 
Specific circumstances may give rise to approaches by the court where the distinction from the outright 
reversal of proof becomes rather subtle, such as when a health care professional has failed to fulfil his 
obligation to maintain an adequate medical file. An example of this situation is that the court might accept 
the patient’s claim that no informed consent was given, when the medical file does not note that the 
required information was provided (which it should), and neither the healthcare professionals’ statements 
nor any other documentation can convince the court that the information was provided.
33
 
                                                          
28 J.L. Smeehuijzen, K.A.P.C. van Wees, A.J. Akkermans, J. Legemaate, S van Buschbach, J.E. Hulst, Opvang en 
schadeafwikkeling bij onbedoelde gevolgen van medisch handelen, Amsterdam: Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, 2013. 
29 The number of instruments to be distinguished here is to some extent a matter of appreciation. 
30 Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) 20-11-1987 ECLI:NL:HR;1987:AD0058 (Timmer/Deutman) 
31 Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) 20-04-2007, ECLI:NL:HR:2007:BA1093 (Mislukte Sterilisatie) 
32 Supreme Court of the Netherlands (Hoge Raad) 18-02-1994, NJ 1994, 368 (Schepers/De Bruin); Supreme Court of the 
Netherlands (Hoge Raad)13-01-1995, ECLI:NL:HR:1994:ZC1269 (De Heel/Korver); Supreme Court of the Netherlands (Hoge 
Raad) 15-12-2006, ECLI:NL:HR:2006:AZ1083 (NNEK/Mourik). 
 
33 Since the medical file is primarily meant to serve medical purposes (good care) and not as a legal instrument, flaws in the 
medical file in itself do not necessarily lead to a decision in the patients’ favor if the healthcare professional is able to provide the 
required information in another manner. This is where the distinction between the reversal of the burden of proof and heightened 
requirements to refutations is upheld. The healthcare professional can repair flaws in the medical file by making a statement or 
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The two other doctrines alleviating the patient’s burden of proof involve the requirement of 
causation – although the first to mention here is the doctrine of loss of chance, which in many 
jurisdictions will not be accepted as having anything to do with causality, only as constituting a particular 
form of compensable damage.
34
 However that may be – scholarly debate in the Netherlands generally 
takes a broader view – the doctrine of loss of chance is accepted by the Dutch Supreme Court
35
 and is 
widely used in medical malpractice cases. So for instance when in the absence of a timely intervention in 
a birth process, the new born child is suffering perinatal asphyxia, that might also have occurred if there 
would have been a timely intervention, the court might ask the medical expert’s opinion about the chance 
of avoiding damage to the child’s brain when the gynecologist would have acted according to his 
professional standard, and when that chance is sufficiently substantial, might award damages for the loss 
of that chance. The second doctrine, referred to as ‘the rule of reversal’, was also developed in general 
liability law, and allows the court to assume but-for causation (conditio sine qua non), unless the 
defendant produces proof to the contrary.
36
 This requires a close proximity between the specific protective 
scope of the norm that was violated (for instance: a protocol instructed in the given circumstances the use 
of anticoagulants, but no anticoagulants were given) and the risk that materialized (in the example: the 
emergence of thrombosis). In such a case, despite the possibility that the risk might also have occurred if 
the norm would have been obeyed (anticoagulants are not always effective), the court may assume, 
because of the close proximity of protective scope and risk (it is exactly for the risk of thrombosis that the 
protocol prescribes anticoagulants), that but for the violation, the risk would not have materialized.
37
 
Obviously, this doctrine can only apply when the norm violated has a sufficiently specific protective 
scope, which is typical for all kinds of ‘safety norms’, but outside that domain hardly ever applies.
38
 
What also seems relevant is that financial barriers to the recovery of claims in health care are 
often higher than in other domains. The Dutch law of damages holds that the costs of out of court 
negotiations, including legal representation and expert opinions, are a compensable head of damage, 
provided that it was reasonable to incur these costs and that they are reasonable as to their amount.
39
 In 
case of traffic accidents, where liability is easily established and remaining discussions tend to be about 
the extent of the damage suffered, this constitutes a substantial alleviation of the position of the plaintiff – 
and a strong incentive not to go to court, as other, less favorable costs arrangements will prevail there. But 
in case of alleged medical negligence, where it can take several years and several expert opinions before 
fault and therefore liability is established, the full financial burden of out of court proceedings rests upon 
the patient, until he might be relieved by the establishment of liability and the subsequent reimbursement 
of his reasonable costs – or not. Numbers vary, but over the years a rough average of around 45% of 
medical malpractice claims tends to be successful.
40
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
providing witnesses because, in the reasoning of the Dutch Supreme Court, he doesn’t have to provide proof. Supreme Court of 
the Netherlands (Hoge Raad) 20-04-2007, ECLI:NL:HR:2007:BA1093 (Mislukte Sterilisatie). 
34 See I. Gilead, M.D. Green, B.A. Koch (eds.), ‘Proportional Liability: Analytical and Comparative Perspectives’, 2013, ECTIL 
and ETL’s Tort and Insurance Law Series, volume 33. 
35 Supreme Court of the Netherlands (Hoge Raad) 27-10-27, ECLI:NL:HR:2017:2786. 
36 See for the development of this doctrine in the case law of the Dutch Supreme Court: A.J. Akkermans, De 'omkeringsregel' bij 
het bewijs van causaal verband, Den Haag: Boom Juridische uitgevers, 2002. 
37 Supreme Court of the Netherlands (Hoge Raad), 2-3-2001, ECLI:NL:HR:2001:AB0377. 
38 For a comprehensive discussion of case law doctrines alleviating the burden of proof of causation, see A.J. Akkermans & Chr. 
H. Van Dijk, ‘Proportionele aansprakelijkheid, omkeringsregel, bewijslastverlichting en eigen schuld: een inventarisatie van de 
stand van zaken’, Aansprakelijkheid Verzekering & Schade, 2012 (5), p. 157-177. 
39 Article 6:96 section 2 DCC. 
40  Most Dutch hospitals are insured with either MediRisk or Centramed. For MediRisk, liability is accepted or a settlement 
reached in around 45% of the cases (46% in 2013, 41% in 2014, 44% in 2015, 44% in 2016) (published online: 
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Finally, it might be, although reliable data are lacking, that adverse medical events and their 
aftermath are – in general – also emotionally more burdening than the average traffic accident, because 
they occur within a relationship of trust between the patient and the health care professionals, whereas no 
preexisting bond of trust will be compromised between those involved in a traffic accident. What has 
empirically been established is that claim procedures can put severe emotional stress on patients. Patients 
who claim for compensation might experience secondary victimization, a new trauma caused by the 
nature and course of the legal procedure.
41
 Research into patients’ experiences suggests the adversarial 
nature of procedures is especially stressful.
42
 The attitude of the healthcare provider, professional or 
insurance company as experienced by the patient can be hurtful. And, for all the reasons mentioned 
above, procedures can take years before reaching a final solution. 
 
A. 4.2. It’s not (only) about the money 
It is a constant outcome of research into the motives and experiences of patients pursuing a claim in 
health care, that financial compensation is often not reported as their sole or even primary motive.
43
 In the 
Netherlands as well, research has revealed a variety of non-financial needs and motives, that might be 
prioritized above a monetary award, such as the clarification of what has happened, acknowledgement of 
fault, the taking of responsibility for the incident and its consequences, the offering of apologies, seeing 
justice done, and preventing the same incident from occurring again.
44
 This is consistent with findings 
among the victims of personal injury in general,
45
 the only difference appears to be that non-financial 
concerns seem even more significant to patients than to others.
46
 These findings are problematic to 
traditional liability law. It is clear that the functioning of liability law in its traditional sense – the fair 
allocation of financial compensation – leaves room for improvement. But for those who seek fulfilment of 
non-financial needs as described above, the adversarial nature of the traditional civil procedure tends to 
lead them further astray. Discussions escalate, opinions harden, parties alienate, and generally it becomes 
more difficult if not impossible to achieve reconciliation. This is considered to be contrary to liability 
law’s intrinsic restitutionary goals. 
 
A. 4.3. Patients’ needs, the ‘second victim’, and the importance of ‘just culture’ 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
https://www.medirisk.nl/kennisbank-preventie/feiten-en-cijfers.)  For Centramed this is 37% over the period of 1994-2016 
(published online: https://centramed.nl/over-centramed/centramed-in-cijfers).  
41 About the effect of legal procedures on (mental) health of claimants: N. Elbers, Empowerment of injured claimants: 
investigating claim factors, procedural justice and e-health, Amsterdam: VU University, 2013. 
42 N. Elbers, Empowerment of injured claimants; 42 J.L. Smeehuijzen et al, Opvang en schadeafwikkeling bij onbedoelde 
gevolgen van medisch handelen. 
43 C. Vincent, M. Young, A. Phillips, ‘Why do people sue doctors? A study of patients and relatives taking legal action’, Lancet, 
1994 (343): 1609:13; T. Relis, Perceptions in Litigation and Mediation. Lawyers, Defendants, Plaintiffs, and Gendered Parties, 
Cambridge University Press, 2009; T. Relis, ‘It’s not about the Money, a Theory on Misconception of Plaintiffs’ Litigation 
Aims’, Pittsburgh Law Review, 2017, p. 1-48. 
44 44 J.L. Smeehuijzen, K.A.P.C. van Wees, A.J. Akkermans, J. Legemaate, S van Buschbach, J.E. Hulst, Opvang en 
schadeafwikkeling bij onbedoelde gevolgen van medisch handelen; A.J. Akkermans, K.A.P.C van Wees, J.L. Smeehuijzen, 
‘Ervaringen van patiënten bij onbedoelde gevolgen van medisch handelen.’ In: S.D. Lindenbergh & A.J. Akkermans (Eds.), 
Ervaringen met verhaal van schade. Van patiënten, verkeersslachtoffers, geweldsslachtoffers, burgers en werknemers 
(Civilologie / Civilology, 7) (pp. 33-56). Den Haag: Boom Juridische uitgevers, 2014. 
45  A.J. Akkermans, ‘Reforming Personal Injury Claims Settlement: Paying More Attention to Emotional Dimension Promotes 
Victim Recovery’, Torts & Products Liability eJournal, 2009, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1333214, A.J. Akkermans, & 
K.A.P.C. van Wees, ‘Het letselschadeproces in therapeutisch perspectief: hoe door verwaarlozing van zijn emotionele dimensie 
het afwikkelingsproces van letselschade tekortschiet in het nastreven van de eigen doeleinden’, Tijdschrift voor Vergoeding 
Personenschade, 2007, afl. (4), p. 103-118. 
46 S.D. Lindenbergh, A.J. Akkermans (Eds.), Ervaringen met verhaal van schade. Van patiënten, verkeersslachtoffers, 
geweldsslachtoffers, burgers en werknemers (Civilologie / Civilology, 7). Den Haag: Boom Juridische uitgevers, 2014. 
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The healthcare professional has an important, if not central, role to play in responding to the needs of 
patients. A swift, empathic and open response of the healthcare professional can prevent escalation and 
unnecessary (legal) conflict. There are, however, many barriers that can keep the healthcare professional 
from the appropriate response.
47
 On the organizational level, the prevalence of a ‘blame culture’ can 
obstruct openness for fear of being held personally responsible and the possibility of negative (legal) 
consequences.
48
 A strong sense of hierarchy and a limited ability to accept or give criticism can constrain 
healthcare professionals to speak up about their own or their colleagues (near) mistakes.
49
 On a personal 
level, experiencing disclosure as difficult and fear of the patients reaction can be factors negatively 
influencing willingness to disclose.
50
 Also, the assumption that disclosure is not in the patients’ best 
interest is mentioned as a barrier to disclosure.
51
 And last, but certainly not least, healthcare professionals 
can suffer severely after experiencing an adverse event, a phenomenon that has given rise to the term 
‘second victim’,
52
 an expression not without controversy, yet widely used to express the possible impact 
of an adverse event on the healthcare professionals involved.
53
 Symptoms vary from worrying about the 
patient, loss of professional confidence, shame, and worry about loss of reputation,
54
 but also symptoms 
of a more serious and clinical nature occur such as depression, insomnia, hyper-alertness, PTSS-like 
symptoms such as flashbacks
55
 and suicidal ideation.
56
 It is probably safe to assume this can negatively 
                                                          
47 Many barriers, personal, professional, organizational and cultural barriers towards being open have been discussed in literature.  
For an extensive (and to our knowledge, most recent) review of the available literature concerning open disclosure and its 
impeding factors: Y. Birks, R. Harrison, K. Bosanquet, J. Hall, M. Harden, V. Entwistle, et al. An exploration of the 
implementation of open disclosure of adverse events in the UK: a scoping review and qualitative exploration. Health Service 
Delivery Research 2014;2(20). Kaldijan et al provide a  clear taxonomy of factors impeding disclosure: L.C. Kaldjian, E.W. 
Jones, G.E. Rosenthal, T. Tripp-Reimer & S.L. Hillis, ‘An Empirically Derived Taxonomy of Factors Affecting Physicians' 
Willingness to Disclose Medical Errors’, Journal of General Internal Medicine, 2006, 21 (9), p. 942-8; More recently, Carillo et 
al analyzed the relationship between factors that contribute to healthcare professionals informing patients and apologizing after 
an avoidable adverse event. Their research points towards the significance of an organizational culture that favors disclosure, 
positive example by colleagues, and positive experiences (or the lack of negative experiences) with disclosure as factors that 
positively impact the attitude towards disclosure. I. Carillo, J. Mira, S. Lorenzo, e.a. ‘Why an open disclosure procedure is and is 
not followed after an avoidable adverse event’, Journal of Patient Safety 2017 [online]. 
48 R. Pinto, O. Faiz, C. Bicknell, C. Vincent, ‘Surgical complications and their implications for surgeons’ wellbeing’, British 
Journal of Surgery, 2013 (13) 100, p. 1753.  
49 O.G. Aasland, R. Førde, ‘Impact of feeling responsible for adverse events on doctors’ personal and professional lives: the 
importance of being open to criticism from colleagues’, BMJ Quality & Safety 2005 (14) p. 13-17; ‘Waardeer de frisse blik van 
de co: afhankelijkheid bij coassistenten nog altijd sta-in-de-weg’, Medisch Contact, 24 september 2015. Article in the magazine 
published by the Royal Dutch Medical Association. The article elaborates on the barriers medical students and residents 
experience in criticizing unsafe behavior by supervisors. Published, fittingly, anonymously by a professor and student of 
medicine.  
50 G.E. Linthorst, B.L. Kallimanis-King, D. Dekker, J.B.L. Hoekstra, J.C.J.M. de Haes, ‘What contributes to internists 
willingness to disclose medical errors?’, The Netherlands Journal of Medicine (70) 5, p. 242-248, p. 247. 
51 and to our knowledge, most recent) review of the available literature concerning open disclosure and its impeding factors: 
Birks Y, Harrison R, Bosanquet K, Hall J, Harden M, Entwistle V, et al. An exploration of the implementation of open disclosure 
of adverse events in the UK, p. 21-22. 
52 A. Wu, ‘Medical error: the second victim’, BMJ, 2000;320, p. 812.  
53 A. Wu, J. Shapiro, R. Harrison, et al. ‘The impact of adverse events on clinicians: what's in a name?’, Journal of Patient Safety 
2017 Nov 4; [Online available via: https://psnet.ahrq.gov/resources/resource/31601/the-impact-of-adverse-events-on-clinicians-
whats-in-a-name]  
54 D.L. Schwappach, T. A. Boluarte, ‘The emotional impact of medical error involvement on physicians: a call for leadership and 
organisational accountability’, Swiss Medical Weekly 139(1-2), p. 9-15. 
55 L. Schouten, K. Vanhaecht, E. Coeckelbergs, G. Zeeman (2018). ‘Onbedoelde schade treft ook de arts: impact van 
patiëntveiligheidsincident op zorgverleners wordt onderschat’, Medisch Contact 2018 (37): 3, p. 14-16. 
56 T.D. Shanafelt, C.M. Balch, L. Dyrbye, G. Bechamps, T. Russell T, D. Satele, T. Rummans, K. Swartz, P.J. Novotny, J. Sloan 




impact on the ability of professionals to properly disclose. Supporting health care professionals after a 
medical incident helps to relieve the impact
57
 and probably aids in disclosure. 
 Concerns about preventable harm in healthcare have led to a growing attention for ‘culture’ and 
how culture affects patient safety. Psychology professor James Reason introduced the ‘Swiss Cheese 
Model’ to visualize the interaction of systemic context and individual acts in the occurrence of errors,
58
 
inciting a lively debate about the sense and nonsense of allocating the responsibility for adverse medical 
events to individual healthcare professionals.
59
 The desirable alternative to a blame culture is a ‘just 
culture’. In a just culture, it is recognized that competent and dedicated professionals may make mistakes, 
and the often important role of the organisational context in making mistakes is acknowledged, while at 
the same time a clear line is drawn between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour.
60
 In a just culture, 
adverse events are investigated in order to learn from them without putting the healthcare professional on 
trial.
61
 A just culture allows openness to play its pivotal role in both patient safety and the better 
resolution of adverse events. 
Support and guidance for ‘second victims’ is an essential part of a just culture. In several Dutch 
hospitals, peer support systems are being set up to that purpose.
62
 Talking to peers, learning from the 
incident, talking to and apologizing to the patient, and adjusting practices to prevent the same from 
happening again, are among mechanisms that help ‘second victims’ to cope and recover.
63
 We lack 
specific (Dutch) data on whether and how compensation procedures influence the recovery of ‘second 
victims’. What we do know is that complaint- and disciplinary procedures are often taxing.
64
 Blame, 
implicit or explicit, is prevalent in legal procedures in healthcare, either as an inherent element of the 
                                                          
57 D. Seys, S. Scott, A. Wu, E. van Gerven, A. Vleugels, M. Euwema, M. Panella, J. Conway, W. Sermeus, K. Vanhaecht, 
‘Supporting involved health care professionals (second victims) following an adverse health event: a literature review.’, 
International Journal of Nursing Studies 2013, 50 (5), 678-687; E. van Gerven, L. Bruyneel, M. Panella , M. Euwema, W. 
Sereus, K. Vanhaecht, ‘Psychological impact and recovery after involvement in a patient safety incident: a repeated measures 
analysis’, BMJ Open 2016, p. 1-10. 6:e011403. doi: 10.1136/bmjopen-2016-011403 . 
58 J. Reason, ‘Human error: models and management’, BMJ: British Medical Journal 2000, 320 (7237), p.768.-770. 
59 Debate is mostly centered around finding the balance between ‘no-blame’ and personal accountability. Amongst others: M. 
Walton, ‘Creating a “no blame” culture: have we got the balance right?’ BMJ Quality & Safety 2004 (13) p. 163-164; R.M. 
Wachter, P.J. Pronovost, ‘Balancing ‘No Blame’ with Accountability in Patient Safety’, The New England Journal of Medicine 
2009 (361) 14, p. 1401-1406; and the concept of ‘just culture’ as the road in between: S. Dekker, Just culture: balancing safety 
and accountability, London: Ashgate, 2007. 
60 S. Dekker, T. Laursen, ‘From punitive action to confidential reporting’, Patient Safety and. Quality in Healthcare 2007 (5) p. 
50-56; Dekker, S. W., T. B. Hugh, R. Wachter, P. Pronovost, ‘Balancing No Blame with Accountability in Patient Safety’ New 
England Journal of Medicine 2009, 361 (14), p. 275. S. Dekker, T. Laursen, , ‘Balancing No Blame with Accountability in 
Patient Safety’ New England Journal of Medicine 2010, 362 (3), p. 275-276, commentary on Wachter and Pronovost. 
61 ‘Just culture’, what it takes to be ‘just’, and its importance for patient safety is far more complex than the global description we 
can offer here but the literature referred to in footnotes 58, 59 and 60 can be a starting point for those who are interested.  
62 B.S. Laarman, M.C. Bomhoff, R.D. Friele, A.J. Akkermans, J. Legemaate, ‘OPEN: open en eerlijke omgang na klachten en 
incidenten in het ziekenhuis. Schriftelijk verslag van project OPEN’, Utrecht: NIVEL 2016, p. 35-43. 
63 M. Plews-Ogan, N. May, J. Owens, M. Ardelt, J. Shapiro and S. K. Bell, ‘Wisdom in medicine: what helps physicians after a 
medical error?’ Academic Medicine 2016, 91(2), p. 233-241. 
64 R.D. Friele, M. Hendriks, B.S. Laarman, R. Bouwman, A. de Veer, Zorgverleners en burgers over het openbaar maken van 
door de tuchtrechter opgelegde berispingen en geldboetes, Utrecht: NIVEL 2017, report on a qualitative study considering the 
impact on the professional functioning and private lives of publishing disciplinary measures on healthcare professionals. (English 
publication in preparation: R. Bouwman, B.S. Laarman, A. de Veer, M. Hendriks, R. Friele, ‘Publication of disciplinary 
measures: learning opportunity of punishment? A questionnaire survey among medical doctors on the experienced 
consequences’); J.M. Bruers, B.A.F.M. van Dam, R.C. Gorter, M.A.J. Eijkman, ‘The impact of a formal complaint on Dutch 
dentists’ professional practice: a survey study’, BMC Oral Health 2016 (104), L.M. Verhoef, J. Weenink, S. Winters, P. B. 
Robben, G. P. Westert and R. B. Kool, ‘The disciplined healthcare professional: a qualitative interview study on the impact of the 
disciplinary process and imposed measures in the Netherlands’ BMJ open 5(11); Y. Alhafaji, B. Frederiks, J. Legemaate, 
‘Ervaringen van klagers en aangeklaagde artsen met het tuchtrecht’, Nederlands-Vlaams tijdschrift voor Mediation en 
conflictmanagement 2009, 13 (3) p. 18-42. 
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procedure itself, as is the case in disciplinary law - notwithstanding the fact that disciplinary law in the 
Netherlands is formally aimed at maintaining quality of care and not punishment - or it seems to 
inadvertently creep in because of the way procedures are carried out: formal, adversarial and mostly in 
writing. 
 The good news is that the mechanisms that benefit the recovery of ‘second victims’ correspond 
directly to patient’s needs after adverse events and facilitate improving patient safety by learning. 
Supporting ‘second victims’ and helping them to engage in dialogue with the patient, facilitates the 
recovery of both patient and healthcare professional. This in turn prevents harmful and unnecessary 
juridification. Supporting healthcare professionals in coping with adverse events is directly linked to both 
patient safety and to responding to patient’s individual needs. 
 
B. EFFORTS FOR REFORM 
 
B.1. The Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes Act (WKKGZ) 
Concerns about the position of patients led to the aforementioned Healthcare Quality, Complaints and 
Disputes Act (WKKGZ) which came into force in 2016. The WKKGZ is a legislative attempt to achieve a 
fundamental change in the way complaints and claims are handled in healthcare, emphasizing an open, 
informal and proactive response to both claims and complaints. Relevant new statutory provisions are: (1) 
claims for compensation are considered to be ‘complaints’ in the meaning of healthcare complaints law 
(see explanation below) and have to be resolved accordingly; (2) an independent complaints officer must 
be available to patients; (3) a short timeframe for handling complaints/claims applies; and (4) if 
unsatisfied with the healthcare provider’s response to their complaint/claim, patients can resort to an 
independent healthcare disputes tribunal that can take binding decisions, including binding awards of 
damages up to € 25.000. These new statutory provisions seek to improve the patients’ position by 
providing informal, inexpensive, and quick avenues for the resolution of both claims and complaints.  
 
B. 1.1 Health care complaints law as a non-adversarial alternative to liability law 
Since the 1990s, hospitals have had the statutory duty to receive, investigate and resolve any complaints 
of patients concerning the provided care. What might be called ‘health care complaints law’ provides for 
an internal procedure and is aimed at remedying the patient’s issue. While the procedure before a medical 
disciplinary tribunal is also triggered by a ‘complaint’,
65
 this procedure is quite different in both nature 
and end. The disciplinary procedure is aimed at maintaining quality of care. The procedure is formal, the 
patients’ complaint serves only as a ‘signal’, the procedure does not seek to provide personal satisfaction, 
either financially or emotionally, and usually leaves little room for reconciliation.
66
  
The ‘complaints law’ referred to here is all together something different. Both in the Netherlands 
and internationally, the origins of complaints law lie in situations characterized by inequalities of power. 
                                                          
65 Both nationally as internationally, what exactly is meant with the word ‘complaint’ depends on the context. In Dutch 
healthcare alone, four different legal procedures can be distinguished that are all triggered by a ‘complaint’ (klacht). A complaint 
can be an issue about healthcare, either big (‘my operation was done wrong’) or small (‘the doctor was impolite’); can be 
informal (delivered orally and resolved by the healthcare professional himself or a complaints officer) or formal (filed in writing 
and to be followed up by an official written response of the healthcare provider). As mentioned, a ‘complaint’ can also be lodged 
at a medical disciplinary tribunal, and, lastly, ‘complaints’ can be made to the National health care contact point (Landelijk 
Meldpunt Zorg, translation by authors) of the Health Care Inspectorate. The National health care contact point offers advice on 
how to solve the complaint, but does not investigate complaints itself. 
66 Therefore, the medical disputes tribunals make increasing efforts to solve the complaint in a meeting (‘mondeling 
vooronderzoek’) with the patient and the healthcare professional, prior to the procedure.  
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The classic example is the relation between governmental agencies and citizens, but power inequalities 
can also be found between citizens and non-governmental institutions, large commercial companies and 
consumers, insurance companies and their insured, and so on. In the Netherlands all sorts and shapes of 
instruments can be found that are employed to effectuate the right to complain, such as ombudsmen, 
complaints committees and –officers, organized by institutions internally, externally or somewhere in 
between, and whether or not in collaboration with consumer- citizen- or patient organizations. What all 
these institutions have in common is that they seek to empower plaintiffs by ensuring that their 
complaints are received and properly investigated.
67
  
‘Healthcare complaints law’ is a part of complaints law that is more extensively regulated by the 
legislator than most others. The WKKGZ has added to the hospital’s existing statutory duties in regard of 
complaints, extended them to all health care providers, and has included claims into its definition of 
complaints. Potentially, this has far reaching consequences. While the substantive rights of claimants to 
compensation remain determined by the general law of torts and damages, the resolution of claims is to be 
governed, not by reactive and adversarial civil procedure, but by the proactive and solution focused 
procedures of healthcare complaints law. In theory this is a fundamental difference.  
Traditional civil procedure departs from the presumption of the equality of the parties. The facts 
are established in a process of submission and refutation in which both the initiative and the burden of 
proof lie with the patient. If a patient does not present sufficient facts to support his claim, or fails to 
present sufficient proof, it will be rejected. Healthcare complaints law by contrast, departs not from 
equality, but from its inherent objective of redressing inequality. It requires the health care provider to 
actively investigate the complaint, take the initiative in the discovery of facts, and to complement or even 
correct in good faith the presentations made by the patient. 
It remains to be seen, however, to what extent the healthcare providers will succeed in effecting 
the paradigm shift in the resolution of claims aspired by the WKKGZ. To begin with, the large majority 
of claims in the Netherlands are resolved in (sometimes long-drawn-out) out of court negotiations, a 
context where procedural regimes are of course far less compelling than in a procedure before the court. 
The WKKGZ now requires healthcare providers to integrate these negotiations into their complaints 
resolution procedures – or perhaps one might better say, to replace these negotiations, at least initially, by 
complaints resolution procedure. Clear as the statutory requirements may be, any supervision of 
compliance can only happen afterwards, if settlement according to complaints procedure has failed and 
parties have resorted either to court or to an independent healthcare disputes tribunal (see explanation 
below). At that moment in time effective remedies will be scarce.  
Secondly, the hospital staff that are involved in the resolution of complaints are traditionally quite 
separate from those who are involved in the handling of claims. The former may be accustomed to the 
demands of a proactive and solution focused approach in resolving issues, but the latter generally are not. 
As described above, although some hospitals have an internal legal department that handles claims – all 
claims, or only those below a certain threshold – many hospitals refer claims to their liability insurer. 
Most professionals involved, mainly lawyers, both those at the hospitals and at the insurance companies, 
will have reached their professional maturity within the bounds of conventional adversarial tradition. It 
will take more than the legislature waving its magic wand to make them change the way they go about 
their affairs. This is why efforts from the bottom up, such as the Code of conduct on medical incidents 
and the OPEN learning network of hospitals that are described below, are so important.  
                                                          
67 B.S. Laarman & A.J. Akkermans, ‘De afwikkeling van medische schade onder de WKKGZ’, p. 59. 
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The most promising developments are to be found among the growing group of hospitals that 
have taken claims handling into their own hands. In some of these hospitals the conviction has taken root 
that a claim for compensation is not an exclusively legal issue but concerns the institution as a whole. On 
the operational level, this means that claims handlers work in a close partnership with complaint officers, 
quality and safety officers, the healthcare professional in question, and where necessary, the board of 
directors, to investigate and address not only the claim but also other motives behind it than its ostensible 
purpose, whether made explicit or not. As mentioned above, financial compensation is often just one of 
the patient’s issues. And it is a truism that complaints procedure is in principle an excellent setting for a 
more comprehensive approach – so much can be granted to the legislator.  
 
B.1.2 An independent complaints officer or ‘patient contact person’ 
Prior to the adoption of the WKKGZ, nearly every hospital in the Netherlands retained a ‘complaints 
officer’.
68
  In 2014, the Association of Health Care Complaints Officers published a professional profile, 
detailing the goals, tasks, position and competences of complaints officers in hospitals.
69
 According to 
this profile, the complaints officer is to contribute to a more equal relationship between patients and 
health care professionals, mediate conflicts and contribute to a better quality of care by signaling 
repetitive complaints. The complaints officer acts independently from the board of directors, with respect 
for the privacy of those involved, and much of his work is confidential. For patients and health care 
professionals, the complaints officer is easily accessible, and he takes a proactive role, while respecting 
the professional’s own responsibilities. Core activities are providing ‘first emotional aid’, information, 
advice and assistance, mediating conflicts, process guidance and monitoring (for example during root 
cause analysis or claim procedures).
70
  
In reality, the majority of complaints officers have up till now played a much more marginal role 
than this, and the envisioned proactive role rarely materialized in practice. Several explanations have been 
put forward, such as the difference in educational level between healthcare professionals and complaints 
officer, the (resulting?) difference in social status, the lack of professionals’ familiarity with complaints 
procedures, and the negative association with the word ‘complaint’ resulting in professionals not wanting 
to have anything to do with complaints officers - or all of the above. However this may be, the WKKGZ 
now obliges all healthcare providers (so not only hospitals) to have an independent ‘person’ available 
who can ‘offer assistance when patients have a complaint’ and help them find their way.
71
 Combined with 
the far going ambitions of the WKKGZ in regard of the proactive, informal, inexpensive, and quick 
resolution of both claims and complaints, this seems to imply a more prominent role for complaints 
officers.
72
 In particular, the emphasis of the WKKGZ on proactive complaints management, that 
effectively seeks to prevent the filing of complaints by solving issues at the earliest opportunity in an 
informal manner, assigns this ‘person’ a central and active role as a point of contact for patients. Even the 
label ‘complaints officer’ has become unsuitable, as the focus is on solving issues before they develop 
into a ‘complaint’, which may explain why these officials are increasingly called ‘patient contact person’, 
‘patients’ confidential advisor’ or other varieties of this sort.  
                                                          
68 R.D. Friele, C. de Ruiter, F. van Wijmen, J. Legemaate, Evaluatie wet klachtrecht cliënten zorgsector (Evaluation of the 
Healthcare Clients’ Rights of Complaint Act), Utrecht: ZonMw 1999. 
69 Currently under revision. 
70 VKIG Beroepsprofiel, downloaded from: https://www.vkig.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/2014_vkig_beroepsprofiel-versie-
1_okt-novweb.pdf 
71 Art. 15 WKKGZ. 
72 J. van Dijk, S. van der Aa, R. van Loon, C. Heusschen, Focus op klachtenfunctionarissen: een onderzoek naar de informele 




B.1.3 Short timeframe for handling claims and complaints 
Earlier research into the experiences of patients in complaint procedures showed that hospitals often took 
a long time to respond to complaints – and sometimes no response was given at all.
73
 The WKKGZ sets a 
six-week-timeframe for the assessment of both claims and complaints, with a possible extension of four 
weeks. If the health care provider does not succeed in providing a satisfactory response – the WKKGZ 
requires a written ‘conclusion’ (oordeel) – within this timeframe, the patient can refer his complaint to an 
independent healthcare disputes tribunal (see below). According to the parliamentary history of the Act 
there is, however, some room for manoeuver, as this written ‘conclusion’ does not necessarily amount to 
a final judgment; if circumstances so require, it can suffice to explain that more time is needed and to 
indicate the steps that will be taken to reach a final conclusion.
74
 The timeframe of 6 weeks serves to 
ensure that healthcare providers do respond to complaints.  
Together with the goal of informal and quick resolution of claims and complaints, this short 
timeframe seems to lead to a growing tendency to offer patients the option of a so a called ‘leniency 
payment’:
75
 a short route to limited compensation (perhaps comparable to the ‘limited imbursement 
programs’ in the US),
76
 without a full blown investigation in the provided standard of care, and without 




B.1.4 Independent healthcare disputes tribunal 
The last but – potentially – not the least of innovations of the WKKGZ to be discussed here, is the 
creation of a low cost and low-threshold alternative to court proceedings by obliging healthcare providers 
to set up, in collaboration with representative organizations of patients, independent healthcare disputes 
tribunals. These tribunals are to be officially acknowledged by the Ministry of Health, and can take 
binding decisions, including binding awards of damages up to € 25.000, and have to do so within six 
months. As mentioned above, patients can resort to a tribunal as soon as the health care provider does not 
provide a satisfactory response to a complaint within the timeframe of six weeks. The WKKGZ contains 
only general requirements for the tribunals, the operational details were left to the health care sector to 
decide upon. This resulted in a list of requirements being drawn up by a national group of representatives 
of healthcare institutions, patients’ organizations and medical liability insurers,
78
 on the basis of which 
requirements 31 different tribunals were established, divided over different sectors of health care. 
The national list of requirements demands claims for compensation to be assessed according to 
general liability law. The president of the tribunal will be a lawyer – often a judge or an otherwise 
experienced adjudicator – and the members have to be nominated by either healthcare providers or 
patients’ organizations. The composition of the tribunal can further depend on the given case, as at least 
one of the members is assumed to have sufficient expertise in the medical discipline involved in the 
dispute.  
                                                          
73 S. Kruikemeier, R. Coppen, J.D.J. Rademakers & R. Friele (2009) Ervaringen van mensen met klachten over de 
gezondheidszorg, Utrecht: NIVEL 2009. 
74 Kamerstukken I 2015/16, 32402, 2, item 8. 
75 ‘Coulancebetalingen’ (translation by the authors). 
76 M.M. Mello, R.C. Boothman, T. McDonald, J. Driver, A. Lembitz, D. Bouwmeester, B. Dunlap, T. Gallagher (2014). 
‘Communication-And-Resolution Programs: the challenges and lessons learned from six early adopters’, Health Affairs 2015, 33 
(1), p. 20-29. 
77 MediRisk (2017) Toelichting ‘Procesflow: Partnership in klachten- en claimopvang’. 
78 G. de Groot, Kaderstellend programma van eisen WKKGZ-geschilleninstanties, Tijdschrift voor Vergoeding Personenschade 
2016 (3) p. 53-63. 
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The costs of the procedure differ. No government funding is provided. For patients the costs are 
low, certainly compared to court proceedings. No representation is required, and in case of a claim a fee 
of € 50 applies. Consequently, the operational costs of the tribunals have to be born one way or another 
by the healthcare providers. Details of costs arrangements vary; healthcare providers can pay a fee of € 
1.500 up to € 2.300 for every dispute that is brought before the tribunal. The tribunal can require the 
healthcare provider to reimburse the patient’s fee, but conversely, no costs order can be made against the 
patient, save for the, probably exceptional, situation that the tribunal is of the opinion that the costs were 
‘needlessly caused’. 
The independent healthcare disputes tribunals of the WKKGZ have drawn a lot of attention, but it 
remains to be seen whether they will become a success. The dispute tribunals have been in operation since 
January 2017, and until the fall of 2017, only 242 complaints were filed, of which 69 led to a binding 
advice, of which an unknown number involved a request for monetary compensation of one sort or 
another.
79
 Given the annual amount of health care claims and complaints, this can only be considered a 
marginal number.
80
 There are no available data on why cases are or are not brought before the tribunals, 
but a combination of factors gives rise to the fear that it might turn out that they will not play more than a 
marginal role in resolving claims, and that only a limited number of low value and/or weak cases will be 
brought before them. We cannot elaborate on all issues relevant to this assumption here, but the main 
concern lies in the combination of the fact that the tribunals do not award legal fees – whereas, as 
mentioned above, in the context of out of court negotiations, the costs of legal representation and expert 
opinions are a compensable head of damage – and the fact that a decision of a tribunal cannot be 
appealed.  
The motives to exclude the award of legal fees probably involve the desire to prevent unnecessary 
juridification of relatively ‘small’ cases (that is, up to € 25.000) and the perception (or hope) that lawyer 
assistance will not be necessary. Understandable as these considerations might be – yet not necessarily 
correct
81
 – it is difficult to see why a legal counsel or anyone else providing legal support, would ever 
advise a patient to bring his case before a tribunal, where even if he prevails he will have to bear all his 
costs; unless the value of the claim and/or the chances of succeeding are estimated as so low, that the 
lawyer in question is hesitant to take on the case, and prefers the client to go to the tribunal unrepresented. 
In any strong case, continuation of out of court negotiations seems to be the preferable alternative, and 
even if one ultimately has to go to court, if the court finds for the plaintiff it can make a costs order 
against the defendant (which will not suffice to cover all costs, but still will be significant).  
It is – in our opinion, regretfully – not an option for the patient to try his case before the tribunal 
unrepresented, and consider any alternatives later. The decisions of the tribunals are to be binding and 
cannot be appealed. That is, unless fundamental principles of civil procedure have not been met, such as 
                                                          
79 R. Bouwman, I. van Gennip, R. Friele, Monitor WKKGZ, Utrecht: NIVEL 2017, p. 27-28. 
80 In 2016, the LMZ received 6.455 complaints; liability insurer MediRisk received 785 claims; liability insurer Centramed 
received 870 claims; the Medical Disciplinary Tribunal received 1.646 complaints. R. Bouwman et al, Monitor WKKGZ, p. 21-
32. It has to be noted that these numbers represent only a fraction of the total amount of complaints, as many complaints are not 
registered but resolved informally by complaints officers or the healthcare professionals themselves.  
81 In our view, the providers of legal support have a crucial role to play in the realization of many aspirations of the WKKGZ, not 
the least in the success or failure of the tribunals. We cannot elaborate on this here. Even in the no-fault system of New Zealand, 
research has shown that the assistance of lawyers is highly appreciated by patients and can strongly contribute to reconciliation. J. 
Moore & M.M. Mello, ‘Improving reconciliation following medical injury: A qualitative study of responses to patient safety 
incidents in New Zealand’, BMJ Quality & Safety, 2017 (26) p. 788-798. 
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independence and impartiality, equality of arms,
82
 and a proper reasoning by the tribunal of its decision. 
This has to do with the fact that the authority of the tribunal to resolve the issue between the parties is 
considered to be based on the (implicit) agreement between the parties to accept its decision. This 
doctrinal categorization is not unproblematic in regard of the healthcare provider, who is obliged by 
statute to accept the tribunal’s jurisdiction as soon as the patient files his issue there. For this reason, it has 
even been submitted that this is in violation of article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR).
83
 However that may be,
84
 decisions of the tribunals normally cannot be appealed, and a patient 
who would appreciate legal support may better think twice before he puts his case to a tribunal. 
B.2. Efforts from the bottom up 
As mentioned above, the Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes Act (WKKGZ) aims to achieve a 
fundamental change in the way complaints and claims are handled in healthcare. However, such a change 
cannot be achieved by legislation alone, as it requires a change in ‘culture’ among all professionals 
involved, away from conventional adversarial tradition and towards solution focused, restorative and 
reconciliatory approaches, that can be considered an integral part of an even wider ranging necessary 
change in healthcare as a whole, from ‘blame culture’ to ‘just culture’. The WKKGZ was, however, not 
adopted in a vacuum, but must be understood as the legislator’s response to ongoing developments in the 
healthcare sector and in society at large. There have been and still are several initiatives ‘from the bottom 
up’, that in one way or another try to contribute to the comprehensive change that is meant here. We will 
limit ourselves to discussing two of these, the Code of conduct on medical incidents and the OPEN 
learning network of hospitals.  
 
B.2.1 Code of Conduct on Medical Incidents (GOMA)  
In 2010, stakeholders in medical liability (insurance companies, hospitals’ associations, the Royal Dutch 
Medical Association (KNMG), patient’s attorneys) collaborated in drafting the Code of conduct on open 
communication after medical incidents and better resolution of medical malpractice claims (Gedragscode 
Openheid na medische incidenten; betere afwikkeling Medische Aansprakelijkheid, GOMA). The GOMA 
contains a total of nineteen principles; ten of which are relevant to healthcare professionals and/or 
providers, urging the swift and proactive investigation of incidents, and a swift, open and proactive 
response to claims (part A), and nine principles aim to promote the just and expeditious resolution of 
claims by articulating rules of conduct of patient’s lawyers and insurance companies’ claims handlers 
(part B).
85
 Although the GOMA is a form of private regulation, its binding force should not be 
underestimated. Most parties are directly bound to the GOMA as they – or organizations representing 
them – have formally declared that they will act in accordance with it. Only the patient’s attorneys have 
made no such declaration, on the basis of the reasoning that they are not free to bind their future clients in 
                                                          
82 The principle of equality of arms has been developed by the European Court of Human Rights in the context of the right to a 
fair trial (Article 6 ECHR). Equality of arms requires that there be a fair balance between the opportunities afforded the parties 
involved in litigation. 
83 J.C.J. Dute, L.H.M.J. van de Laar, ‘Komende klachtwet gezondheidszorg: ondoordacht én onrechtmatig’, Nederlands 
Juristenblad (NJB) 2014 (82) 2, p. 106-107. 
84 This obviously depends on the guarantees, both substantive and procedural, which are in place. See European Court of Human 
Rights, Guide on Article 6 of the Convention – Right to a fair trial (civil limb), Chapter III, Institutional requirements, available 
at https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_6_ENG.pdf 
85 Phenomenon where a situation escalates into legal conflict, opinions harden and it is increasingly difficult to come to a 
reasonable solution.   
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any way. They are nonetheless bound indirectly, as the principles of the GOMA are widely accepted and 




The GOMA is currently under revision. The coming into force of the Healthcare Quality, 
Complaints and Disputes Act (WKKGZ), which has transferred the handling of medical claims from civil 
procedure to healthcare complaints law and initiated all the other changes referred to above, requires the 
elaboration of many operational details. The process of redrafting the GOMA involves numerous expert 
meetings and other forms of consultation, creating ample opportunity for the exchange of ideas between 
the different professions and organizations about how best to go forward in the present climate of change. 
All key activities, such as the consultation and involving of relevant organizations and individuals, the 
preparation and chairing of expert meetings, the editing and publication of proceedings, and the editing of 
the consecutive drafts of the Code, are in the hands of academics (your authors among them). Phrased in 
terms of research methodology, the drafting process is inspired by the principles of participatory action 
research (PAR).
87
 The participation of all relevant professions and organizations, the repetitive 
publication of intermediates, and the involvement of both academics and practitioners, is not only 
expected to benefit the quality of the outcomes, but also the support the new Code of conduct will need to 
be successful.    
 
B. 2.2 The OPEN learning network of hospitals 
A second ‘bottom-up’ initiative to be mentioned here, is the OPEN learning network of hospitals. OPEN 
too, is a collaboration of academics – a multidisciplinary group of social scientists, lawyers (your authors 
among them) and practitioners, that is inspired by the principles of participatory action research (PAR). 
The heart of OPEN is the learning network of, at the time of writing, 21 hospitals that are keen to achieve 
progress in the follow-up of patient safety incidents. The participating hospitals are prepared to share the 
problems they encounter and the solutions they have found with the other hospitals and the researchers. 
Important activities are not only network meetings, but also the sharing of information in separate 
interviews, and the drafting and revising of so called ‘knowledge documents’: documents in several forms 
(leaflets, folders, handouts, but also journal articles) that summarize research findings for practice, are 
published on the website of OPEN,
88
 and updated when possible. Key activities, such the preparation and 
chairing of network meetings, and the drafting and publishing of ‘knowledge documents’, belong to the 
responsibilities of the researchers. Adverse medical events are a sensitive subject, and building the trust 
required for a learning network devoted to this issue takes considerable effort and time. But it has been 
proven to be possible and very much worthwhile. At the network meetings, members feel safe to share 
dilemmas, fears and barriers to being open. The number of participating hospitals is gradually growing. 
OPEN has been operational since 2015 and has yielded a significant outcome. The learning network is 
                                                          
86 J. Legemaate, A.J. Akkermans, R.D. Friele, Openheid over medische fouten: waar staan we?, Nederlands Tijdschrift voor 
Geneeskunde, 2015 (159) pp. 1-4. 
87 Both the redrafting process of the GOMA and the OPEN learning network (to be discussed below) are inspired by the 
principles of participatory action research (PAR). It is, given its dynamic and context-dependent nature, difficult to find a sole, 
concise definition of what PAR is. Houh and Kalsem (2016) provide a definition that closely resembles the dynamics of both the 
redrafting of the GOMA and the OPEN network, when they state: ‘PAR is research that concerns itself with action – making a 
difference, moving toward solutions – but only when those differences to be made or solutions have been agreed on and 
determined in community. The research and the action must be participatory, with those who will be affected by the actions – 
the stakeholders – involved at all stages of the research and decision-making process’. E.M.S. Houh & K. Kalsem, ‘Theorizing 
Legal Participatory Action Research: Critical Race/Feminism and Participatory Action Research’, Qualitative Inquiry 2015, 21 
(3) 262-276, p. 265. 
88 www.openindezorg.nl, unfortunately, except for some explanation of OPEN, entirely in Dutch.  
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The Netherlands experiences all problems inherent to the compensation of damage caused by healthcare 
that are common to many jurisdictions. Traditional procedures respond to claims and complaints in an 
inadequate and unsatisfactory way, to the detriment of both patients and health care professionals. The 
good news is that there is a clear momentum for change shared by all relevant organizations and 
institutions. This, however, is not easily achieved. What is required is no less than a change in ‘culture’, 
away from conventional adversarial tradition and towards solution focused, restorative and reconciliatory 
approaches, that is to be part of a wider ranging change in healthcare, from ‘blame culture’ to ‘just 
culture’. This is going to take time. The Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes Act (WKKGZ) has 
given substantial incentives for such change, but can only succeed to the extent that healthcare providers 
and relevant others will successfully implement the reforms initiated by the legislator. We have tried to 
give a concise overview of the present state of affairs. It seems too early to draw any conclusions about 
the scope and success of the current reform efforts. We do what we can and hope for the best. 
